In this article, we describe and analyze the emergence of a scientific discipline, usability science, which bridges basic research in cognition and perception and the design of usable technology. An analogy between usability science and medical science (which bridges basic biological science and medical practice) is discussed, with lessons drawn from the way in which medical practice translates practical problems into basic research and fosters technology transfer from research to technology. The similarities and differences of usability science to selected applied and basic research disciplines-human factors and human-computer interaction (HCI) is also described. The underlying philosophical differences between basic cognitive research and usability science are described as Wundtian structuralism versus Jamesian pragmatism. Finally, issues that usability science is likely to continue to address-presentation of information, user navigation, interaction, learning, and methods-are described with selective reviews of work in graph reading, controlled movement, and method development and validation.
INTRODUCTION
Our purpose in this article is to describe and analyze the emergence of a new applied scientific discipline, usability science. We believe that usability science covers the conceptual area between the basic cognitive and behavioral sciences (primarily cognitive and perceptual psychology) and usability engineering. Our examination of this nascent field describes (a) a rationale for its emergence, (b) analogical comparisons with other applied sciences, (c) differences between usability science and related basic and applied fields, (d) the philosophies underlying the relevant basic research fields and usability science, and (e) selected critical issues around which usability science appears to be organizing itself. As with any observational study, the raw observations we make about the emergence of usability science may lend themselves to alternative interpretations. We neither mean to preclude any other in-formal proposals along these lines come from Carroll and Kellogg (1989) and Woods (1998) . These authors suggested that we can consider each design to be the designer's implicit theory about aspects of human perception and cognition. Thus, one purpose of psychological science should be to unpack and compare the theoretical claims that underlie the design of usable and unusable interfaces (e.g., Carroll & Campbell, 1989) .
As a consequence of the limited instances of direct application of cognitive and perceptual theories, models, and experiments to the design of usable computing systems, we hear frequent complaints from usability engineers that they cannot use basic research from cognitive and perceptual psychology (see Bias & Gillan, 1998; Gillan, 1998) . The absence of a substantial impact of cognition and perception on interface design can be seen as a failure of technology transfer. In previous articles (Gillan & Bias, 1992; Gillan & Schvaneveldt, 1999) , we examined several reasons for this failure, including differences between research and design in mission, timeline, rewards, activities, and modes and types of communication.
Roswell Test and Applying Cognitive Psychology
The serious failure of the translation of knowledge from cognitive and perceptual research to HCI design or to any other real-world application can be seen by conducting a thought experiment, which we call the Roswell Test. Imagine that aliens from outer space had crashed their UFO at Roswell, New Mexico in 1948 and that they were only part of a larger invasion force. Furthermore, imagine that the invasion force had decided to conquer the world by eliminating progress in one science during the next 50 years. Now, think about how your everyday life might have been changed if that one science in which no progress occurred had been cognitive psychology. Would your home be different? Your car? Workplace? Schools? Recreational activities? Health care? In contrast, consider how your life might have been changed if there had been no progress in genetics or geology or biochemistry. If cognitive psychology had been on the right track for the last 50 years, one might think that there would be some obvious application that had an impact on our everyday lives. The pragmatic approach to psychology (e.g., James, 1907) , which we discuss in more detail later, suggests that the real world often provides the best tests for scientific theories. If that is true, cognitive psychology appears not to have passed many of the tests.
The failure of transfer of knowledge from basic cognitive research also has potentially serious consequences for usability engineering. In the absence of this transfer, designers tend to create designs based on their own assumptions about how people perceive and think rather than based on a set of empirically validated principles. For example, take the ubiquitous use of movement and flashing in advertising on Web sites. Both the movement and light flashes stimulate motion detectors in the peripheral visual system, and as a consequence, automatically attract focal attention to that motion or flash. This automatic shift of attention may be valuable to the advertiser the first one or two times that it occurs. However, the automatic attraction of attention may continue more or less unabated as the motion continues, which users are likely to find annoying. As a consequence, users may leave the site for one that is more congenial to completing their task, so the Web site loses customers (we write this from personal experience-Douglas Gillan refuses to return to certain Web sites containing ads that use excessive motion). Alternatively, users may develop "banner blindness"-that is, they may learn to avoid fixating "their eyes on anything that looks like a banner ad due to their shape or position on the page" (Nielsen, 1999, para 30) . Nielsen (1979) suggested that the continuing reduction in click-through rates at Web sites may be due to users developing banner blindness to ads that interrupt their main task. Forcing users to develop an attentional strategy that leads to ignoring information is also not the goal of Web site or ad designers. Rather, an understanding of the psychological principles used directly in the design-say, ads that flashed or moved only once or twice after a user entered a Web site then stopped and statically maintained their spatial location-would lead to more useful Web sites.
In addition to identifying reasons for the failure of translating cognitive and perceptual principles and research into interface designs, we (Gillan & Bias, 1992; Gillan & Schvaneveldt, 1999) have also previously described some approaches to increase this transfer, including instantiating psychological principles as design guidelines and design analysis tools and the use of gatekeeping tools, which might translate cognitive and perceptual research findings into interface design ideas. In this article, we attempt to provide a framework for approaches to technology transfer between experimental psychology and interface design by examining the development of an applied science that mediates between the two disciplines-usability science.
ANALOGIES BETWEEN USABILITY SCIENCE AND OTHER APPLIED SCIENCES
Examining a science that has been shown to transfer knowledge successfully between the basic research world and fields of practice provides a point at which to begin a discussion of the relation of basic perceptual and cognitive psychology with usability science. Medical science serves as a successful interface between basic biological science and medical practice, with many of its researchers having dual training as scientists and physicians. In fact, the history of the biological and medical sciences suggests that the distinction between researchers and practitioners was simply not made initially. For example, Ignaz Semmelweis was a practicing physician who, in the 1840s, observed that the rates of death from childbed fever (also known as puerperal fever) were much higher in a maternity ward in which surgeons delivered babies than in a ward in which midwives delivered babies (see Hempel, 1966, for a review) . Following the death from childbed fever of a surgeon friend who had cut himself during the autopsy of a childbed fever victim, Semmelweis proposed that an invisible agent caused childbed fever. He instituted policies that required surgeons to disinfect their hands and change their coats after surgery, resulting in a dramatic decline in deaths in the surgeons' maternity ward. (Unfortunately, following a surgeon's complaints about the new policies, Semmelweis was fired. He ultimately died in an insane asylum, the victim of a blood infection that may have been childbed fever.) With the advent of germ theory, biologists came to recognize that the invisible agent that Semmelweis proposed was a germ. Some of the most compelling evidence for germ theory came from Robert Koch, another practicing physician who functioned as a basic research scientist (see Brock, 1999 , for a review). Koch was a country doctor who, as he studied the blood of anthrax victims (both cows and humans) in the 1870s, observed a large microbe that he hypothesized might be the causal agent for anthrax. Fearing that, as a rural physician, the established scientists would not accept his hypothesis, he extracted and purified the microbe and then gave it to animals that became infected. He repeated this cycle of isolating the target agent, extracting the agent, using the agent to infect a healthy participant, then isolating the agent from the new victim, ultimately identifying the microbe as the cause of anthrax. Koch's method became the necessary test for establishing that a target agent is the cause of a disease.
Interestingly, not all of the early advances in biology came from medical needs. In the 17th century, van Leeuwenhoek was a Dutch cloth merchant who used the newly invented microscope to examine the weave of the cloth that he was considering buying. Dissatisfied with the quality of the images that he could see from the microscopes, which he bought from others, he began to grind his own microscope lenses. Eventually he looked at a sample of water through one of his lenses and observed microorganisms such as algae and large bacteria moving. Because of their movement, van Leeuwenhoek described these as living creatures. His drawings and descriptions of these microorganisms captivated biologists.
The field of biology today has greater differentiation between basic science and medical practice than in the time of Semmelweis and Koch. However, there remains a strong flow of ideas and information between applied problems and basic research, with medical scientists serving as the bridge. For example, Stanley Prusiner initiated his Nobel Prize-winning basic research on a protein-based infectious agent (called a prion) in 1972 when one of his patients died from Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (CJD; see Rhodes, 1997) . Prusiner provided evidence that a folded form of a prion may cause a wide range of neural diseases from scrapie in sheep to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (widely known as mad cow disease) to kuru among the indigenous people of Papua, New Guinea, to both the traditional and variant forms of CJD. Although the research on prions has not yet yielded any medical therapies or inoculations, preventative measures (e.g., bans on religious practices in New Guinea and on British beef in Europe) have followed from the research.
Medical science and its relations to basic research in biology and medical practice serves as an imprecise analogy for usability science. As the history of medicine and biology reviewed previously suggests, medical science, biology, and medical practice all evolved from a common ancestor, therefore their linkage is part of their lineage. In contrast, usability science is in the process of evolving now, over a century after basic research in psychology, more than 30 years after cognitive psychology gained preeminence in experimental psychology (e.g., Neisser, 1967) , and several decades after usability engineers began to practice. In addition, the biological and psychological sciences differ in numerous ways, including the relations between measures and constructs, the variability of dependent variables, the physical control over both independent and extraneous variables, the ability for convergent validation, and the reliability of phenomena.
Despite the imprecision of the analogy between the biological and cognitive sciences, we believe that there is heuristic value in examining the relations among basic biological science, the more applied medical science, and the completely applied medical practice-specifically, that such an examination can reveal guidelines for applying science. (Note that a more detailed examination focused on a wide variety of applied sciences, including medical science, might extend these insights.) The first guideline from the review of the application of biology to medical practice is that interesting basic research problems can be identified from knowing about real-world problems. Donald Broadbent, a founder of cognitive psychology, also recognized this.
"Briefly, I do not believe that one should start with a model of man and then investigate those areas in which the model predicts particular results. I believe one should start from practical problems, which at any one time will point us toward some part of human life" (Broadbent, 1980, pp. 117-118) .
A second guideline suggests that observational methods can be critical in applied science. In fact, good observational technique may be as important as training in the specific scientific domain, as was true of van Leeuwenhoek. Third, in counterpoint to the second observation, at least some practitioners need to be able to understand and apply the scientific method so they can make causal inferences about processes and mechanisms. This guideline for applying science was especially important in the case of Koch's identification of the cause of anthrax. Fourth, general methodological approaches and conceptual or mechanistic ideas can organize and guide applied science. As a consequence, applied science can serve as a driving force for progress in a discipline; the applied science need not be merely reactive to events in the related basic science or applied practice. Figure 1 provides a simple graphical representation for the interrelations among basic science, applied science, and field of practice. In addition to the four general FIGURE 1 A conceptual model of the relations between basic science, applied science, and fields of practice. The model shows that some practical issues pass through applied science and are translated into basic research problems (indicated by the solid arrows between fields and the stippled arrow within applied science); some basic research is translated into practical applications (indicated by the solid arrows between fields and the stippled arrow within applied science); and some problems go from practice to applied science without being passed on to basic research (indicated by the striped arrows).
principles proposed previously, Figure 1 indicates an important fifth principle of applied science: Not all issues that go from practice to science end up as basic research problems. An example from medical practice might be the development and evaluation of surgical procedures. Surgeons might develop a new procedure (e.g., for heart bypass operations), then applied researchers would evaluate the efficacy and safety of the procedure relative to existing practice. Typically, in cases such as this, no broad basic issues would be addressed, so only applied researchers would become involved. As we discuss later, evaluating usability engineering methods may be a parallel case, with usability scientists but not basic cognitive psychologists taking the primary interest.
RELATION BETWEEN USABILITY SCIENCE AND OTHER DISCIPLINES
The previous discussion begins to distinguish the function of usability science from the functions of both basic cognitive psychology and usability engineering. Cognitive psychology focuses on describing general principles and understanding the mechanisms of high-level perception, memory, thinking, language, and so forth. On the other hand, usability engineering centers around the design, development, and evaluation of usable technological artifacts. Usability science can serve, at least in part, as the means by which (a) problems identified by usability engineers can be translated into more basic research issues, and (b) theories, empirical laws, and empirical findings can be put into terms usable for design, development, and evaluation. Accordingly, usability science needs to be more general than usability engineering, working on overarching issues that should influence many different specific artifacts. (We describe some of those overarching issues later in Section 5.) In contrast, usability science needs to be more specific than cognitive psychology and cognitive science, focusing on making technological applications easier to use.
What about other disciplines that seem to fall in the middle ground between psychology and technology, specifically human factors and HCI? Actually, previous and ongoing research that might be considered to be in the domain of usability science has been done by researchers in human factors and HCI. However, we believe that the emerging usability science as a discipline differs from these others. We start by asserting that if human factors and HCI had been an effective bridge between basic research in cognitive psychology and the developers of usable technology, there would not be so much technology that is so difficult to use. Also, usability engineers might not report that they do not typically make use of information from basic cognitive psychology (e.g., Gillan, 1998 ). Yet usability science needs to be more than simply a recasting of these two older disciplines. The set of issues that we believe define usability science should differ in content and emphasis from those that have defined human factors and HCI.
Examining these disciplines may help to differentiate them from usability science. Human factors is a broad field concerned with "the study of how humans accomplish work-related tasks in the context of human-machine system operation, and how behavioral and nonbehavioral variables affect that accomplishment" (Meister, 1989, p. 2) . Human factors deals with many issues that are outside of the purview of usability science (at least as we see it), including anthropometrics and biomechanics. In addition, the focus of human factors on work-related tasks and on machines is narrower than in usability science that would not be restricted to work and might study nonmechanical artifacts that humans use, such as a university campus. For example, many Web sites involve extracting information relevant to the users' personal lives rather than their work, but those users should find those Web sites easy to use.
Consider that usability science is merely an extension of human factors outside of the realm of working with machines, and consider the important difference of the training of human factors professionals, as it is currently practiced, versus our vision of training of usability scientists. Almost all human factors professionals who receive explicit training at a university are in engineering departments (most frequently, industrial engineering) or psychology departments-of the 87 graduate programs listed in the Human Factors Directory for Graduate Programs (Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 2000) , 37% (i.e., 32 programs) are in psychology departments and 48% (i.e., 41 programs) are in engineering programs. One problem with these two approaches to human factors is that the engineering programs, in general, train students to apply rules or algorithms as a way to implement science, with minimal training in research. In contrast, psychology departments tend to teach research methods and basic principles in experimental psychology but much less about usability design and evaluation, compromising the psychology students' ability to bridge basic research and practice. As a bridge between basic psychological research and usability practice, we envision a cadre of usability scientists trained to both conduct research and design usable artifacts located in various universities, companies, and government agencies.
The field of HCI differs from usability science because of the former's exclusive focus on computing and often on the interactive aspects of using computers to the exclusion of less interactive aspects such as reading displays. In contrast, usability science considers the usability of both computing and noncomputing technologies. Norman's (1988) description of doors that people cannot figure out whether to push or pull provides an example of such difficult to use, low-tech artifacts. In addition, the field of HCI in recent years has been dominated to an extent by the development of technologies that could possibly lead to increased usability but that have not been demonstrated to do so. Gillan and Schvaneveldt (1999) distinguished between need-based technological development (i.e., technology based on the needs of the users) and designer-based development (i.e., technology based on the technological capabilities of the designers). HCI has focused more on designer-based than on need-based development. For example, we examined all of the articles from two randomly selected recent computer-human interaction (CHI) conferences-1995 (Katz, Mack, Marks, Rosson, & Nielsen, 1995) and 1998 (Karat, Lund, Coutaz, & Karat, 1998 )-and placed each article into one of the following six categories: (a) description of a need-based HCI development project, (b) user-focused articles (including user performance and user models), (c) user evaluation studies (including competitive evaluations, evaluation methods, and evaluation case studies), (d) description of a technology-based HCI development project with no user data at all, (e) description of a technology-based HCI development project with user test data (this ranged from 2 users providing qualitative responses to a full-scale user test), and (f) descriptions of design method and case studies. (We categorized articles, but excluded posters, short reports, and design briefings.) Table  1 , which shows the categorization from the 2 years of CHI, reveals the same basic pattern for both years-virtually no articles described development projects that had a clear empirical basis in the needs of users, but well over half of the articles described technology-based development projects. Within those technology-based development projects, about half had no user data and half had at least some post hoc user support for the development. If we consider the first three categories to be user focused and the latter three categories to be technology focused, then across the 2 years 48 articles were user focused and 101 articles were technology focused. Based on the binomial distribution, with the assumption that half of the articles should be of each type, this split between the two types would happen by chance less than 5% of the time. In other words, the CHI conference proceedings articles support the previous assertion that HCI, at present, has a strong technology focus. This is in contrast to the user focus we propose for usability science.
PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS
During the past 20 years, the issues that have dominated theory and research in basic cognitive and perceptual psychology have focused on identifying the elements of the mind and their relations. These issues include the architecture of cognition (e.g., Anderson, 1983 Anderson, , 1993 McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986) , the number and characteristics of different memory systems (e.g., Tulving, 1985) , the mental modules in language and other cognitive processes (Fodor, 1983) , and the neuropsychological correlates of cognition (e.g., Squire, Knowlton, & Musen, 1993) .
The focus of modern cognitive psychology on the elements of the mind resembles structuralism (Gillan & Schvaneveldt, 1999; Wilcox, 1992) , a philosophical approach to psychology developed in Germany late in the 19th century by Wundt and popularized in the United States by Titchener (1898) in the early 20th century. Wundt and Titchener appear to have been influenced by physical chemistry in proposing that consciousness could be decomposed into mental elements and that the role of experimental psychology was to catalog those elements and Note. CHI = computer-human interaction.
to understand the ways in which they combined to create mental structures (e.g., Titchener, 1898) . In addition, the structuralists of that time believed that psychological science should not attempt to be applied, but should seek knowledge for its own sake (Neel, 1969) . Note that a popular movement in philosophy, anthropology, and literary criticism during the 1960s and 1970s was also called structuralism; however, this version of structuralism came from Saussure's approach to linguistics that focused on the role of structure in the analysis of language (e.g., Gardner, 1972) . We believe that the cognitive psychologists of today have adopted the Wundtian version of structuralism. One of the criticisms of Wundt-Titchener structuralism was that it was too passive and inward focused, with no concern for the cognition of real people as they interacted with the real world. We believe that a similar criticism can be directed toward the neostructuralism of today's cognitive research.
In the United States, opposition to structuralism in the late-18th and early-19th centuries coalesced around two related philosophical approaches-functionalism and pragmatism. Dewey (1896) proposed that the recently described reflex arc could serve as a metaphor for the basic unit of the mind; this idea provided the impetus for the development of functionalism. Thus, in contrast to structuralism, functionalism proposed that the purpose of the mind was to transform perceptual inputs into behavioral consequences. As functionalism developed, it came to focus on how organisms used these stimulus-response acts to mediate between the world and their goals or needs (e.g., Angell, 1907) . Functionalism focused on the functions of thought, with practical applications being one of the important aspects of the development and testing of theories (Carr, 1925) .
Charles Peirce (1878) developed the philosophical doctrine of pragmatism as a theory that proposed that how people think is a function of what they are prepared to do. Peirce proposed that thought is valuable only to the extent that it produces observable and generally agreed-on useful actions. William James (1907) extended Peirce's doctrine (and, according to Peirce, ruined it) by suggesting that thought is valuable if it produces an outcome in the world that is of value to the actor. James (1975) suggested the question "What special difference would come into the world if this idea were true or false?" (p. 268) lay at the heart of pragmatism. In other words, James's (1907) version of pragmatism suggested that the mind functions pragmatically, with people selecting to think in ways that can lead to personally valuable outcomes.
A second sense of James's (1975) question is often taken as the single hallmark of pragmatism (e.g., Sternberg, 1999) : What special difference would come into the world if a scientific idea were true or false? According to this view, the way to evaluate a scientific idea is based on its practical value in the world. As we suggested in the discussion of the Roswell Test, a related way to think about this is that the world provides the ultimate testing grounds for scientific theories.
Clearly, the second sense of pragmatism, that science must be applicable to be useful (or, as we claimed earlier, that the value of a theory is proved by its application in the world), is a central tenet of usability science. The research of usability scientists will have value to the extent that it affects the creation of usable technology. In this principle alone, usability science differs from basic research in cognitive sci-ence. However, we also believe that the sense that James (1907) originally intended for his question-that pragmatic concerns guide our thinking-is an important principle of usability science. Accordingly, usability science should be considered to be a pragmatist science.
If usability science takes seriously the notion of pragmatism as the basis of cognition, how would that inform the science that we do? We believe that it reorients our model of cognition in the following four ways: (a) cognition is goal oriented; (b) cognition helps us adapt to the world; (c) cognition is closely tied to actions and their consequences in the world; and (d) the physical, social, cultural, and task contexts of the world in which cognition occurs set the conditions for cognition. Conducting research that removes goals, adaptation to the world, action and consequences, and the various kinds of context as key parameters leads to research that may be only generalizable to a narrow set of circumstances defined by that experiment. Yet, the typical experiment in cognitive psychology during the past 20 years has controlled all of these features as potential contaminants in the investigation of the basic cognitive elements. The desire to control these features in a research environment can lead to research that only describes cognition for those narrow circumstances, with little possibility to make contact with the cognition of real people acting in a real or a virtual world. In the next section, we point out how research that defines usability science has attempted to address, rather than control, some of these experimental foci of pragmatism.
SELECTED ISSUES FOR USABILITY SCIENCE
In this section, we propose that certain issues in usability science will be enduring ones. However, our ability to gaze into the future will undoubtedly be imprecise; therefore, we do not claim that the issues described here will (or should) circumscribe the emerging discipline of usability science. Undoubtedly, based on the model shown in Figure 1 , issues will arise from users' needs, from the needs of the usability design and development community, and from basic research in perception and cognition. However, due to the nature of human perception and cognition, as well as the ways in which people interact with technology, certain general issues are likely to be important on a continuing basis for designing the usability of any system. In addition, usability science will be likely to make major contributions to our understanding of these issues, also on a continuing basis. These base issues in usability science include (a) the presentation of information by a system to the user (covering such topics as the effects of the user's task on how to present information, the role of user expertise, and the perceptual capabilities and disabilities of the user), (b) user navigation through physical and informational spaces (including spatial metaphors for navigation and models for information retrieval), (c) modes and methods of interaction with a system (with specific topics such as the effects of automation and the consequent active versus passive control, attention in interacting with the system, command language vs. direct manipulation, and motor control), (d) acquiring knowledge and transferring knowledge of use from one system to others (including user mental models of systems and tasks, instructional methods, active learning of a system, minimalism in training, and designing for errors), and (e) the development and adaptation of methods (including identifying methods that could be helpful to usability engineers and validating the application of those methods). A thorough review of any one of these content areas of usability science exceeds the scope of this article-each area deserves a separate review article. Accordingly, the following sections provide a very selective review of research in three areas, with two sources of bias motivating the selections: The research reflects content areas of interest to the authors and exemplifies the pragmatist approach to science.
Presentation of Information
In recent years, one major area of research on presentation of information has been the graphical display of quantitative information. Much of the research on this topic has involved comparisons of types of displays to determine which produces the best performance. However, over the past 10 to 15 years, some researchers have focused on understanding the perceptual and cognitive processes involved in graph reading. This approach to graph reading is of interest here in part because it makes use of a neostructuralist approach to meet a pragmatist agenda. Specifically, a finding related to pragmatism from this graph reading research is that the cognitive and perceptual processes used to read graphs vary as a function of many different contextual variables: the task, the specific features of the graph, and the graph reader's knowledge, strategies, and culture.
The task context influences graph reading in several ways. When people use a specific graph (e.g., a line graph), they do not apply the same perceptual and cognitive processes across all tasks. For example, Gillan and Lewis (1994) and Gillan and Neary (1992) found that reading a line graph to compare two points involved visual search and spatial comparison, whereas reading a line graph to determine the difference in value between the same two points involved visual search, encoding of values, and arithmetic computation. Similar task-dependent differences in application of processing components have been shown with bar graphs (e.g., Gillan & Neary, 1992; Lohse, 1993) and pie graphs (Gillan, 2000a; Gillan & Callahan, 2000; Simkin & Hastie, 1987) . The task context may also interact with the features of the graph. Carswell and Wickens (1988; see also Carswell, 1992; Wickens & Carswell, 1995) found that focused tasks (e.g., tasks that involved processing only single data points or simple two-indicator comparisons) were most effectively performed if the graph was a separable graph, such as a bar graph. In contrast, a graph reader's performance in an integral task (e.g., tasks involving global comparisons or synthesizing across multiple data points) was better if the graph was an object-like integral graph, such as a line graph, rather than a separable graph.
The usefulness of object-like graphs to perform certain tasks turns out to be influenced by the perceptual strategies of the reader, as well as by the task. In research on star graphs (multivariate graphs consisting of lines radiating from a central point, with the length of each line indicating an amount), Gillan and Harrison (1999) observed graph readers using two different types of perceptual strat-egies to identify the different star in a set of four (the difference was that one of five lines that made up the star was slightly longer in one of the stars). One type of reader showed no difference in the time to identify the different star as a function of the position of the longer line on the different star; in contrast, other graph readers showed a pattern of taking longer to decide which star was different as the longer line was further off vertical. These two types of graph readers correspond to Cooper's (1979) Type I (holistic) and Type II (analytic) perceivers, respectively. Of most interest, adding object-like features (an outline of the star made by joining the ends of each line segment) decreased the time to identify the different star in a set of four only for the holistic perceivers. Thus, the context of a graph reader's perceptual strategy also influences the perceptual and cognitive processes that the reader applies.
The graph readers' knowledge is another critical contextual variable that needs to be taken into account in trying to understand both the processes of graph reading and how to design graphs. Gillan (1995) trained people in a perceptual method for estimating the mean of a set of data points represented in a bar or line graph by determining the graphical midpoint of the relevant data and then finding the value of the midpoint. This perceptual method was labeled visual arithmetic. In contrast, Gillan and Lewis (1994) found that people without training in visual arithmetic would estimate a mean by searching for each indicator, encoding each indicator's value from the y-axis, then performing the mental arithmetic on the set of values necessary to find the mean. Gillan (1995) showed that graph readers trained in visual arithmetic were both faster and more accurate to estimate a mean from a graph than were those who received no training but that the improved performance did not generalize to other tasks. Thus, graph readers procedural knowledge will influence the component processes that they apply to complete a given task with a graph.
Finally, the cultural context of the graph readers can influence how people read graphs. Tversky, Kugelmass, and Winter (1991) found that graph readers from cultures with a printed language that is read left to right had better comprehension of a graph that had the x-axis ordered with the lowest value at the far left of the axis and ascending values rightward; in contrast, graph readers from cultures with a printed language that is read right-to-left had better comprehension of a graph with an x-axis organized in the right-to-left. All graph readers had better comprehension when the y-axis was ordered with low values on the bottom and high values on the top, independent of their culture.
These experimental studies in the processes of graph reading have led to an enhanced understanding of both the perceptual and cognitive processes that underlie graph reading performance and how various kinds of contextual influences modulate the reader's application of those processes. In addition, these studies-in line with the second sense of pragmatism described previouslyhave led to specific applications intended to result in improved graph production. Lohse's (1993) studies and model served to guide the development of a computer-based tool that analyzes graphs and makes recommendations for improvements based on performance predicted by the model. The research described previously by Gillan, Carswell, and Wickens (Gillan, Wickens, Hollands, & Carswell, 1998) served as an important basis for a set of guidelines for graph design for publications of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. Finally, Gillan and Callahan (2000) used their model and research on pie graphs to develop new versions of the pie graph designed to eliminate the need for graph readers to apply certain processing components.
Interaction and Control
Our review of this topic is focused on the importance of understanding the user's goal, even in very basic interactions with technology. One of the simplest and most heavily studied acts in HCI is using a mouse to move a cursor in a straight line to a target. The time required to perform this act has been described using Fitts's law: MT = a + b[log 2 (distance/target size)] (see Card et al., 1978 , for an early application of Fitts's law to HCI, and MacKenzie, 1992, for a review). However, even for this simple act, knowing the user's goal is essential.
One common application of Fitts's law to HCI has been pointing in text editing (e.g., Card et al., 1978 Card et al., , 1983 . In text editing tasks, users point at a block of text with the goal of selecting that text. As Card et al. (1978) modeled this, participants pointed at a text block of varying size, with the size of the block of text serving as the target size in Fitts's law equation. However, Gillan et al. (1990 pointed out that most word processing programs use a point-and-drag selection method and that the user's goal is not to point at an entire block of text but to point at the initial letter of a block of text across which he or she will drag the cursor. As a consequence of the point-drag sequence, the size of the user's target (the initial letter) does not change size as the text block changes size. In a series of experiments, Gillan et al. (1990 showed that pointing time was sensitive to changes in the size of the text block when the user's goal was to select the entire text block by clicking on it (as in a point-click sequence), but was not sensitive to the size of the text block when the goal was to stop pointing at the initial letter and to select the text by dragging (as in a point-drag sequence).
Of interest from the Gillan et al. (1990 experiments was the observation that dragging was slower than pointing, and the slope parameter estimate (b) was markedly higher for dragging than for pointing-355 versus 182, respectively (see also Inkpen, Booth, & Klawe, 1996) . The higher slope parameter estimate for dragging than for pointing suggests that, for dragging, movement time is especially sensitive to changes in the index of difficulty for the movement.
Dragging and pointing differ in several different ways. For example, dragging occurs with a finger holding down a mouse button, whereas pointing occurs without a finger holding down a button. However, research by MacKenzie, Sellen, and Buxton (1991) indicates that this variable accounts for only a small part of the difference between the two movements. In their experiment, the only difference between dragging and pointing was the finger position; although they found a significant difference between the Fitts's law slope parameter estimate, that difference (249 for dragging vs. 223 for pointing) was much smaller than that in the Gillan et al. (1990 research. Thus, we might consider that about 15% of the difference between pointing and dragging is due to the difference in the physical movement. What might account for the remaining difference? One possible explanation concerns differences in the users' goals when they point and when they drag. An error in pointing in normal word processing typically leads to only a small problemmoving the cursor from the end of the pointing movement to the target. In contrast, an error in dragging in normal word processing leads to a much greater negative consequence-restarting the drag movement from the initial point. Thus, one might expect that users would have different goals in the two movements due to the different consequences of erroneous movements-not being too worried about missing a pointed-at target but being more concerned about missing a dragged-to target. A greater focus on accuracy as a goal in dragging than in pointing would likely lead to a different trade-off between speed and accuracy for the two movement types, resulting in different fits to Fitts's law.
Another, very different study provides evidence of the role of the user's goal in understanding how to fit Fitts's law to HCI. Walker and Smelcer (1990) compared selection times between pull-down menus and walking menus. Their analysis of these menus examined two interesting design features: (a) increasing the size of targets as a function of their distance from the cursor, thereby reducing the Fitts's law index of difficulty and, consequently, the movement time; and (b) creating impenetrable borders that backed the menus such that a user could not move the cursor beyond the menu border. They found that both features decreased movement times. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the research was that the impenetrable borders eliminated the logarithmic relation between movement time and the index of difficulty because users could reach the target with a single ballistic movement. In other words, the impenetrable boarders permitted users to change their goal from trading off speed and accuracy to focusing solely on speed-the design had eliminated the need to be concerned about accuracy.
Methodology
As we suggested in the discussion of medical science, one persistent issue for any applied science concerns the development and evaluation of methods. Gillan (2000b) has proposed that usability methods can be organized according to three dimensions: (a) the original genesis of the method (e.g., from basic cognitive psychology, basic anthropology, industrial engineering, or usability engineering practice), (b) the function of the method (data collection, data description, data organization, or data generalization), and (c) the point in the design cycle where the method is used (e.g., predesign requirements analysis, design evaluation, or system testing). Researchers and methodologists may find it useful as they develop or adapt methods to consider them within this multidimensional space.
The use of a spatial metaphor for organizing an analysis of usability methods provides an advantage in thinking about the development of new methods. One way in which new methods might be considered is through the addition of a new dimension in the space. For example, most methods have been developed for collecting and analyzing data from an individual user. Thus, the multidimensional space for methods does not have a dimension concerned with the number of users. However, teamwork is an increasingly important topic-from computer-supported cooperative work on the technological side (see Olson & Olson, 1999 , for a review) to team tasks, team cognition, and team situational awareness on the users' side (e.g., Cooke, Stout, Rivera, & Salas, 1998) . Accordingly, the three-dimensional usability methods space may expand as usability methods expand to incorporate evaluating team knowledge or preferences.
A second way in which a multidimensional methods space might be useful for methodological development would be to use it to identify opportunities for new methods. Usability scientists could examine the methods space for areas that are currently empty. Researchers could then consider the potential uses for a method from that area and, if such a method seemed to provide novel and valuable capabilities for data collection, organization, or analysis, then the method might be developed.
As new methods are brought into the usability tool kit, either because they are incorporated from other fields or they are developed within usability science or engineering, one of the most important functions of usability science will be to determine their validity (Gillan, 2000b) . The topic of validation of methods has already been an important one for usability science. For example, researchers have begun to use multivariate statistical techniques, such as the Pathfinder network algorithm, to organize and analyze sequences of user behavior (Cooke, Neville, & Rowe, 1996; Cooke & Gillan, 1999; Gillan & Cooke, 1998) . Having tools that provide visual representations of units of user behavior can be helpful to interface designers, for example, to arrange controls spatially that will be used close together in time. In addition, being able to organize sequences of behavior into meaningful units may provide insights into the procedural knowledge of users (see Cooke et al., 1996) . However, the successful use of multivariate techniques such as Pathfinder requires research validating that the output of the statistical analysis (in the case of Pathfinder, a network representation of the behavior) is related to other measures of performance (e.g., time to complete the task, number of procedural steps), a form of validation called convergent validity (see Gillan & Cooke, 2000 , for a discussion of convergent validity). Gray and Salzman (1998) recently conducted a detailed examination of the validity of selected usability methods that are already in use. They reviewed and evaluated the claims of five studies concerning validity (Desuvire, Kondziela, & Atwood, 1992; Jeffries, Miller, Wharton, & Uyeda, 1991; Karat, Campbell, & Fiegel, 1992; Nielsen, 1992; Nielsen & Phillips, 1993 ) that compared such usability methods as heuristic evaluations; cognitive walk-throughs; individual walk-throughs; team walk-throughs; user testing; and goals, operators, methods, selection modeling. Gray and Salzman (1998) evaluated these studies designed to compare usability methods for four threats to validity taken from Cook and Campbell (1979) : (a) statistical conclusion validity, which is the ways in which researchers use statistics to decide that a manipulated or predictor variable (e.g., type of test) is related to the outcome variable (e.g., number of usability problems identified); (b) internal validity, which is the ability of the research design and statistical methods to allow the researcher to conclude that the manipulated variable caused observed changes in the outcome variable; (c) construct validity, which is the relations of the predictor variable and the outcome variable with real-world variables of interest; and (d) external validity, which is the ability to generalize from the results of specific research to various targets (population of users, types of usability tests, measures, and sets of control features). In addition to the four threats to validity taken from Cook and Campbell (1979) , Gray and Salzman (1998) reviewed the studies with regard to the threat to conclusion validity. This threat concerns research reports that make claims that either are not addressed by the research or are contradicted by the research. The five research reports that Gray and Salzman reviewed tended to provide advice to readers who might want to apply the results of their research, but the reports often failed to distinguish between the advice and conclusions that were directly supported by the research and those that were not.
Several comments regarding the issue of threats to validity in the five studies reviewed by Gray and Salzman (1998) seem appropriate here. Validation of a method should be viewed as a process, not a single experiment. Any individual experiment or research study will be flawed, with many of the flaws coming from the inevitable trade-offs necessary to implement the original research question or hypothesis. Evaluating any individual study designed to compare or validate usability methods requires an examination of major violations concerning the threats to validity (e.g., a confound that made it impossible to know if the differences in the number of usability problems observed were caused by the type of test). However, evaluating a study also requires sensitivity to the seriousness of a violation. Ultimately, the key question is whether the value of the information derived from the study outweighs whatever flaws the researchers made in conducting the study. Usability scientists will need to help usability engineers sort through all of the information to come to decisions about the quality of the testing instruments they can select.
Summary of Issues
In Section 5, we provided a brief overview of selected research in three content areas of usability science: (a) presentation of information, (b) interaction and control, and (c) methodology. Given more space and an unlimited attention span in our readers, we could have made similar arguments for the pragmatist approach in the areas of user navigation and the modes and methods of interaction with a system. In addition, readers will likely generate their own candidates for critical issues in usability science; other issues will be aborning as new technologies and the ever changing culture lead to changes in users' needs or as breakthroughs in basic research modify our understanding of perception and cognition. Also, as these areas grow in number and breadth, it will fall to usability scientists to facilitate accurate and efficient bridges between the research and artifacts.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Will usability science continue to emerge and eventually take its position between basic research and the design of usable technology? We believe that the success of usability engineering will ultimately depend on the development of a systematic and broadly applicable body of knowledge that relates principles of human cogni-tion and perception to the design, development, and evaluation of usable technological artifacts. The emergence of usability science creates two interfaces, just as any bridge does: between cognitive science and usability science at one end and between usability science and product design at the other end. Usability scientists will need to continue taking on the task of extending the basic research from one end of the bridge to the other, interpreting the research for engineers, and transforming the needs of users, as identified by usability engineers, into workable scientific hypotheses that can be examined either by basic researchers in cognition or by usability scientists themselves.
What can those who believe in the importance of usability science do to enhance the likelihood that it will flourish? First, individuals' behavior and beliefs need to change; those who are doing work on usability science need to communicate the importance to usability engineers of having a strong and applicable science base and the importance to cognitive psychologists of developing a path for the transfer of research findings to address real-world concerns. Each individual researcher will need to take advantage of opportunities to interact with usability engineers to (a) discover their problems and concerns related to usability methods and (b) relate basic cognitive and perceptual findings and principles to their specific design problems (a good example of this kind of activity can be found in Wickens, Vincow, Schopper, & Lincoln, 1997) . One implication is that usability scientists need to communicate in forums used by usability engineers, not just those used by other usability scientists or basic researchers. These communication outlets include the Usability Professionals Association's (UPA's) annual meeting (the Web site URL for the UPA is http://www.upassoc.org) and the various electronic mailing list forums on the World Wide Web. Unfortunately, the rewards for academic researchers communicating in such forums may not come from the organization that employs the scientists (see Gillan & Bias, 1992 , for a more detailed discussion of the role of rewards in bridging the gap between basic research and usability design). This introduces the second type of change that will be necessary for usability science to succeed: Organizations such as university departments and colleges, funding agencies such as the National Science Foundation, and corporations that employ usability engineers will need to be convinced of the value of usability science. One approach is to develop small-scale proof-of-concept projects that can be used to convince existing organizations of the value of translating basic research findings into design principles (see Bias, Gillan, & Tullis, 1993; Gillan & Bias, 1992 , for examples). Gillan and Schvaneveldt (1999) suggested that building bridges between different disciplines is hard work; changing cultures, as this final point suggests, is even harder work. The value of the goalsbetter usability engineering, a cognitive psychology that can affect people's lives in concrete, positive ways, and more usable technology-makes it worth the effort.
